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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the comparative pass-through of policy rate to the retail 
prices, spillover of prices between Islamic and conventional banking systems, and the 
impact of excess liquidity on these pass-throughs using data from interbank market 
of Pakistan. The results suggest that the monetary policy shock affect retail prices of 
Islamic banks similar to conventional banks, confirming the results of earlier studies. 
Moreover, there is a strong spillover between the prices of two systems; Islamic 
banks are following (leading) the conventional banks in pricing the lending (deposit) 
products. Islamic bank has acquired advantage in the deposit pricing by taping the 
religious depositors, which also may have promoted financial inclusion thereby 
contributing to the economic growth and improved income distribution in the society. 
Our findings suggest that the presence of excess liquidity have no effect on pass-
through of policy rate in the Islamic system, which is contrary to the prevalent notion. 
However, excess liquidity significantly affects the spillovers of prices between the 
systems. These results support the hypothesis that the Islamic banks are investing in 
interest-based government securities indirectly via conventional banks. Our findings 
may help in enhancing the regulatory efficiency of the central banks and the conduct of 
the monetary policy in the countries where dual banking system exists.
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1. Even in the conventional system, presence of excess liquidity may impede monetary policy pass-
through thereby disturbing the retail products’ pricing mechanism [for detail see, Aryeetey (1998), 
Agénor et al. (2004), Saxegaard (2006)].
2. By Shari’ah laws, Islamic banks are required to invest in instruments free of Riba (interest), Gharar 
(uncertainty), Maisir (gambling) and non-Halal (prohibited) activities.
3. For more details, see Section 2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Literature on Islamic finance is preoccupied with assessment of monetary policy 
effectiveness in a hybrid system, where both Islamic and conventional banks 
coexist, by assessing specific channel(s) in spirit of conventional monetary 
transmission mechanism. Such an assessment, however, requires a number of 
factors specific to the Islamic financial system, such as presence of excess liquidity, 
prohibition of interest payments and price spillover from conventional to the 
Islamic financial system, to be taken into account (Khatat, 2016). Specially, in 
presence of price spillover, the central bank’s ability to make precise impact on 
the market condition may be compromised if the financial system includes a well-
developed interest rate channel but less developed Islamic financial system. The 
latter may become conduit to the conventional monetary transmission, though such 
price transmission through Islamic banks may not be expected by the regulators 
due to Sharia restriction. In this situation, differentiated policy tools, if adopted by 
the central bank for the two systems, may become less effective in regulating the 
market conditions. 
At the same time, strong presence of Islamic banks could activate credit channel 
of monetary policy transmission as long as the central bank’s actions affect the 
supply of Islamic credit (Khatat, 2016). Presence of excess liquidity, in either case, 
may weaken the monetary policy transmission as it effect the ability of the banks to 
price their retail products effectively.1 This subject has acquired more importance 
with the rapid growth of Islamic banking in the global financial landscape, as 
excess liquidity apparently is a permanent feature of Islamic financial system. 
Islamic banks have limited investment opportunities since financial instruments 
complying Sharia restrictions are not in abundance.2 Furthermore, Islamic banks 
cannot participate in the interbank market directly, where banks transact mostly in 
Repo using non-Sharia compliant instruments. Neither, it can place excess reserve 
with the central bank to earn minimum return wherever central banks provide 
standing facilities for liquidity management through interest rate corridors. It is 
not surprising that a majority of the Islamic banking scholars surveyed by Iqbal 
(1998) opined that the excess liquidity was a serious problem for some or all 
Islamic banks.
In addition, the presence of excess liquidity in Islamic system may distort the 
conventional interbank rates despite the fact that former is expected to remain 
isolated from the conventional one. Interbank market of Pakistan has experienced 
this phenomenon in recent past, where overnight call rates frequently swung 
to discount, from premium to the repo rate, under the influence of Islamic 
banks’ excess liquidity.3 Such a distortionary effect may have repercussions for 
transmission of policy shocks, not only through conventional banks but also 
through Islamic banks. 
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4. The terminology of rent and investment rate is used to imply the Islamic banks equivalence for 
lending and deposit rates in the conventional banks. 
5. Notable studies reporting the impact of excess liquidity on monetary policy pass-through are 
Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), Agénor et al. (2004), Saxegaard (2006), Sorensen and Warner (2006), 
Lucchetta (2007), Egert and MacDonald (2009), and Gigineishvili (2011).
This study, therefore, assesses the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission 
by incorporating the excess liquidity present in both systems using the interest rate 
channel only, as the realization of this channel is stronger in Pakistan compared 
to other channels. Moreover, Islamic banking enjoys a minor share in Pakistan, 
which makes interest rate channel more interesting for study. In this perspective, 
this research attempts to answer two key questions; first, how excess liquidity 
effect the pass-through of the policy rate to the retail rates (rents/investments) in 
the two systems?4 Second, how excess liquidity effect the price spillover between 
the two systems? The answers to the questions will improve our understanding 
of transmission mechanism, and will help in formulation of effective monetary 
policy not only in Pakistan, but also in other countries where hybrid financial 
system exists. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the impact 
of excess liquidity has hardly been empirically assessed before for the Islamic 
banking system. Existing literature on conventional system investigated this 
impact, but only qualitatively, inferring it as obstructive if coefficient is negative.5 
Our study provides the quantitative estimates not only for Islamic system but also 
for the conventional banking system. Second, this paper divulges into the spillover 
effect of retail rate adjustments between the conventional and the Islamic systems. 
To the best of our knowledge, very few studies [including Bacha (2004), Chong and 
Liu (2009) and Cevik and Charap (2011) and Ben Amar et al. (2015)] have assessed 
this effect. Moreover, the role of excess liquidity as conduit for these spillovers 
has been assessed thoroughly for the first time. Lastly, this research used separate 
retail rates for the conventional and Islamic banks for analysis. Previous work on 
conventional transmission mechanism used the aggregate retail rates, including 
that offered/paid by the Islamic banks. Therefore, estimates of those studies reflect 
the dynamics of overall banking system, even if the motive was to study the 
transmission mechanism in the conventional banking system. 
This paper uses Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) for assessing 
monetary policy pass-through separately for the two systems, and spillover 
of prices between them. To assess the impact of liquidity on the transmission 
mechanism and on the price spillover between the systems, mediator- moderator 
approach is used. Data from January 2004 to October 2016 is used for analysis. Our 
findings, which confirm previous studies, suggest that the monetary policy shock 
affects the retail prices of the Islamic banks similar to the conventional banks. 
Moreover, there is strong spillover of prices between the systems; Islamic banks 
are following (leading) the conventional banks in pricing the lending (deposit) 
products. 
Apparent advantage gained by Islamic banks in deposit pricing could be due 
to inflow of untapped religious deposits suggesting that the advent of the Islamic 
banks have promoted the financial inclusion in Pakistan. Literature [Khan (2010), 
Ming-Hua Liu (2009) and Obaidullah (2005) Ariss (2010)] suggests that Islamic 
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banks generally follow the conventional banks in setting prices of the retail 
products, specifically the deposits, as the former faces the ‘deposit withdrawal 
risk’. Our findings show that it is other way around in Pakistan. Conventional 
banks, being the price taker in the deposit market suffers from the ‘deposit 
withdrawal risk’. For a long time, conventional banks in Pakistan have enjoyed 
low deposit rate, as investment opportunities available to the retail investors were 
limited. This may have changed since the inception of Islamic finance. 
In response to key research questions, our results indicate that presence of excess 
liquidity impedes the pass-through of policy rate significantly in conventional 
banks, but insignificantly in the Islamic banks; the latter being contrary to the 
findings of Iqbal (1998). The assessment of impact of excess liquidity on the price 
spillover suggests that the excess liquidity with the Islamic banks mostly mediates 
this process. In case of shock to the lending price equilibrium, the Islamic excess 
liquidity declines, and resurfaces as a conventional excess liquidity in the long 
run. It is important to note that the excess liquidity with the Islamic banks remains 
mostly in fungible cash reserves form with the central bank. On the contrary, the 
conventional excess liquidity remains mostly in the form of short-term government 
securities, as the central bank frequently intervenes in the interbank market for 
absorption, if this liquidity is more than desired by the central bank. The results 
endorse the possibility of the liquidity transmission from Islamic banks via 
conventional banks to the interest based short-term government securities.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 divulge into the 
structure of Islamic banking in Pakistan besides presenting the review of recent 
literature on this subject. Chapter 3 discusses data and methodology. Chapter 4 
elaborates on the results and finally Chapter 5 concludes with policy discussion. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Perspective of Islamic Finance and its Structure in Pakistan
Doing business in Islamic way requires Muslims to undertake transactions free of 
Riba (interest), Gharar (uncertainty), Maisir (gambling) and non-Halal (prohibited) 
activities. Islamic banks are, therefore, forbidden from taking or offering interest 
or usury. Unlike in conventional banking, a lender in Islamic finance should 
shares the risk of the project with the borrower, as neither the borrower nor lender 
controls the outcome of the venture. This risk sharing in financial contracting by 
replacing ex-ante fixed return, with an ex-post uncertain return based on a profit-
sharing principle, differentiates Islamic from conventional banking. Under this 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) paradigm, only the profit-sharing ratio between the 
financer and borrower is determined ex-ante (Chong and Liu, 2009).
In practice, however, Islamic finance institutions offers both PLS and non-PLS 
products. A financier could opt for direct equity stake, based on participatory 
financing (or PLS), or non-participatory financing (or non-PLS) with no take 
on equity (Khan, 2010). The important participatory forms are Mudaraba, and 
Musharaka. In former contract, a ‘sleeping’ partner contributes capital while 
active partner contributes expertise/knowledge. In latter contract, a financier 
also participates into the activities of the venture. Important non- participatory 
financing form includes Murabaha (‘markup’ or cost-plus sale), Ijara (lease), Bay’ 
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salam/Istisna (deferred delivery), Bai muajjal (deferred payment), Jo’alah (service 
fee), and Qard al hasana (charity/beneficence loan).6
A large number of institutions offer interest free banking based on Islamic 
products in predominantly Muslim, as well as, in non- Muslim countries. Only 
Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan are referred to as countries with full Islamic banking. 
Pakistan’s inclusion in this group is surprising and deceptive as well. Despite 
PLS banking introduced in Pakistan in 1980s, banks never shared losses with 
the depositors neither their depositors received any share in the windfall profits, 
which the banks in Pakistan are making (Khan, 2008). Moreover, the contract 
these banks are making with their client are based on ex-ante fixed rate and 
are benchmarked with the interbank market or policy rate, which makes them 
conventional instead of PLS based Islamic banks. This study, therefore, treats all 
scheduled banks in Pakistan as conventional banks. Moreover, only designated 
Islamic banks established following the recommendation of Commission for 
Transformation of Financial System (CTFS) and Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruling 
in June 2002 as the Islamic.7 Since the 2002, State Bank of Pakistan issued licenses 
for Sharia compliant Islamic banks only, with their own Sharia board that ensures 
its operational consistency with Sharia requirements. 
Table A1, in Appendix, provides an overview of the banking sector of 
Pakistan; which consists of five public sector commercial banks, 32 local private 
banks, four foreign banks and four specialized banks. Foreign banks are mostly 
in non-retail businesses while specialize banks are active in development finance. 
These specialized banks are meant to support the long term growth objectives 
of government and are, therefore, excluded from the definition of commercial 
banks. Besides, there are a number of microfinance banks actively promoting 
financial intermediation. However, the balance sheet size of these microfinance 
banks is very small compared to the conventional and/or Islamic banks. Table 
A2 in Appendix, on the other hand, demonstrates the composition of the Islamic 
banking industry. Islamic banking services provided by six full fledge Islamic 
banks, and sixteen Branch Islamic banks owned by the conventional banks. These 
Branch banks operate as a subsidiary of conventional banks, and are required to 
undertake the financial transactions in accordance with the injunctions of Sharia.
Price determination in conventional and Islamic banks 
The banking literature has extensively provided the conjectured explanations 
of interest rate’s influence on pricing of the Islamic products. For example, El 
Gamal (2006) argues that the Islamic product has to be functionally identical to 
the conventional product since otherwise it would not be approved by banking 
regulators in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries. Moreover, Khan (2010), 
Ming-Hua Liu (2009) and Obaidullah (2005) Ariss (2010), argues that Islamic 
finance competes with the conventional banks and often follows the conventional 
banks while setting the prices of their retail products. Following sub-section 
6. For details, see Khan (2010), Chong and Liu (2009), Baele et al. (2014). 
7. The Commission for Transformation of Financial System (CTFS) was established on 1st order of 
SAB-SC (January 2000) on appeal against ruling of Supreme Court’s Shari’at Appellate Bench of 
December 1999.
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provides a brief overview of the comparative price setting mechanism in banking 
sector of Pakistan.   
SBP regulation requires conventional banks to price their products with 
reference to certain benchmarks. For example, lending rate is required to be linked 
with the relevant tenure Karachi Interbank Offered Rates (KIBORs)8 and deposit 
rate with the SBP Repo rate (i.e., floor of SBP Interest rate Corridor).9 As Islamic 
banks has yet to develop their own benchmark for lending purposes, the SBP 
instructions on pricing of lending products (via BPD Circular 01, 2004) remains the 
guiding framework for loaning business for Islamic banks’ as well. Nevertheless, 
products based on participatory financing (Musharakah, Mudarabah and Wakalah) 
is exempted from KIBOR benchmarking.10
Pricing of the deposits is more complicated in Islamic banking system. Unlike 
conventional banks, Islamic banks are not required to benchmark the deposit 
pricing with the SBP Repo rates. On contrary, Islamic banks are required to share 
their profits from financings, investments and placements with the depositors, 
as their deposit mix is mostly Mudaraba based. Islamic banks in Pakistan pool 
funds from depositors similar to asset management companies.11 These pools 
are identified by their risk and reward features. Each pool works like a virtual 
enterprise having explicitly demarcated sources of funds, ownership of specific 
assets, and income and expenses.12
Other factors, such as Profit Sharing Ratio (PSR), Profit Equalization Reserves 
(PER) and transfer from Mudarib to the depositors as Hiba (or gift) also influences 
the retail price (or profit rate) a depositor ultimately receives. Islamic bank, as a 
Mudarib, has to agree with the depositor (Rabbulmal) on the Profit Sharing Ratio 
(PSR) for distribution of the same between them. Moreover, for profit smoothening 
purposes, an Islamic bank is allowed to create a Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) 
with well-defined criteria from net income of Pool (i.e. the gross income less direct 
expenses and losses, if any).13
Islamic banks are allowed to utilize, fully or partly, the amount of PER to 
improve the returns to the depositors during periods when the pool’s profits are 
below market expectations. Furthermore, the former may forego up to 60 percent 
8. Banks & DFIs should use the Karachi Interbank Offered Rate (KIBOR) of one, three & six-month, 
and other longer tenors, as made available, for pricing of all Rupee Corporate/Commercial bank 
lending (Vide BPD Circular No. 01, 2004). 
9. Vide BPRD Circular No. 07, 2013. Before, the banks were required to pay minimum deposit rate 
prescribed by the central bank from June 1, 2008. 
10. Vide IBD Circular No. 01, 2016.
11. In this contract, Islamic bank is known as Mudarib and their depositors are known as Rabbulmal, 
and profit sharing ratio is to be agreed between the parties right from beginning of the contract. 
12. For detailed instruction on profit & loss distribution, see IBD Circular No. 03 of 2012. Unlike in 
an asset management companies where all cost has to be charged to the profit earned, only direct 
expenses like depreciation of Ijarah assets, cost of sales of inventories, insurance / Takaful expenses 
of pool assets, stamp fee or documentation charges, brokerage fee for purchase of securities/
commodities, and impairment/losses due to physical damages to specific assets is chargeable to 
the pool in the Islamic banking system. Beside, all indirect cost including the establishment cost is 
to be borne by the Islamic bank, as a Mudarib.
13. The monthly contribution into PER will not exceed 2 percent of Net Income, and the accumulated 
balance of PER shall not exceed 30% of Islamic Bank’s Equity or Islamic Banking Fund (IBF) of 
Islamic Banking Division of Conventional banks.
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of its Mudarib share as Hiba (or gift) to meet the market expectation in case of 
lower than expected/market return earned by the pool. However, Islamic banks 
maintaining PER may reduce their (Mudarib’s) share, using Hiba, only if the 
reserve is insufficient to improve the profit payouts to the depositors. 
Despite this elaborate framework, Islamic banks have been blamed for 
exploiting PSR, PER and Hiba only to enhance their competitiveness with the 
conventional banks. Khan (2010) argues that no Islamic Bank has ever charged 
its depositor’s accounts when it incurred losses due to increased non-performing 
assets. On the contrary, Islamic Banks often declared market-competitive returns 
for depositors even when running into financial difficulties. Moreover, sometimes 
central bank’s implicit guarantee on Islamic Bank deposits, as practiced in GCC 
counties, also goes against the very basics of the risk sharing principle of Islamic 
banks.
Excess liquidity: A comparative perspective of Pakistan’s banking
Excess liquidity is often defined as the excess reserve of banks, placed with the 
central banks, over and above the statutory requirements (such as Cash Reserve 
Requirement (CRR) and/or Statutory Liquidity Requirement (SLR)).14 Literature 
(including Agénor et al., 2004; Ruffer and Stracca, 2006; Saxegaard, 2006; and 
Gigineishvili, 2011) defines excess liquidity as a ratio of reserves deposited with 
the central bank by the banks and cash in their vault. However, banks in Pakistan 
holds substantial amount of government securities, which are as liquid as cash 
and provides risk free returns to the holders. Therefore, following Mohanty et al. 
(2006), these eligible government securities are included in the definition of excess 
liquidity for this research.15
Conventional banks in Pakistan have invested heavily in government securities 
specifically in last decade when the economy was experiencing a slowdown. 
Generally, banks park their excess liquidity in treasury bills for short term and in 
Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs) for long term, when credit demand slows down 
or deceleration in economic activity increases expected default risk (Omer at al., 
2015).16 Studies by Nissanke and Aryeetey (1998), Agénor et al. (2004), Saxegaard 
(2006), Sørensen and Warner (2006), Lucchetta (2007), Egert and MacDonald 
(2009), and Gigineishvili (2011) suggest that the presence of excess liquidity 
impedes conventional monetary policy transmission. Like in conventional banks, 
excess liquidity present in the Islamic system remains a subject of controversy for 
the policy makers and researchers alike, as its impact remains yet to be assessed. 
Apparently, Islamic banks invests only in Government Ijarah Sukuk (GIS); a 
Sharia Compliant Islamic financial instrument. However, volume and frequency of 
14. CRR requires banks to deposits a certain part of cash held with the central bank. As per SLR, banks 
are required to invest a certain part of deposits into the government securities. 
15. Thus excess liquidity is defined as the ratio of reserves deposited with the central bank by the 
banks, cash in their vault and eligible government securities, in excess of the statutory limit to the 
total time and demand liabilities of the banks.
16. At the top of that conventional banks parks excess fund with the central banks using the central 
bank’s interest rate corridor facility. Banks receives SBP Repo rate (floor of corridor) on their 
reserve placement with central bank.
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issues of GIS by the government is very low compared to its demand from Islamic 
banks. Moreover, Islamic banks cannot park their excess funds with central bank 
using interest rate corridor, as these facilities are not incompliance with Sharia 
requirements. Given the limited investment opportunity, Islamic banks often live 
with excess liquidity that could unexpectedly spillover to the conventional system 
in a number of ways. 
Figure 1.
Transmission of Excess Liquidity from Islamic to Conventional Banks
Figure 1 indicates one such possibility. In this arrangement, an Islamic bank 
may sell an asset, typically an Ijarah Sukuk to a borrowing bank at a deferred price. 
The borrowing bank sells this asset to another bank and raises cash liquidity for 
its own use. The Islamic bank replenishes its security holding from the market (or 
perhaps from third bank) besides parking liquidity for a specific tenure. As deal 
matures, the borrowing bank repays cash to the Islamic bank with agreed profit.17 
Pakistan’s interbank market has witnessed such liquidity spillover effect since 
2008, as Call market rate frequently slipped below Repo rate in overnight money 
market (Figure 2). Call rate is a price of unsecure lending/borrowing between the 
banks in interbank market while repo is a rate on secured lending/borrowing. 
Theoretically, call rate should be above the Repo rate because of risk premium 
attached to the unsecured lending. The negative premium (discount) on the call 
rate suggests that excess liquidity in the call market is distorting price setting 
mechanism in the interbank market. Therefore, a persistent arbitrage opportunity 
was present in the market; where a bank can earn an arbitrage profit by borrowing 
in call market and lending in repo market. 
17. Islamic banks generally report the transactions as ‘clean’ or ‘call’ lending. This kind of arrangement, 
however, requires three banks to materialize. The third bank also seeks ‘rent’ to get involved in this 
activity which often depresses the rate received by the Islamic banks. 
Islamic Bank ConventionalBank
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Sell asset 
Sell asset to the 
third party 
Liquidity
Sell asset to 
Islamic Bank 
Recover 
liquidity and 
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2.2. A Review of Recent Literature
Hypothetically, Islamic banks should be indifferent to the changes in the interest 
rates, as they rely on interest-free banking. Therefore, bank lending channel attained 
greater importance for studying the transmission of policy shocks in Islamic banks. 
Not surprisingly, a large number of studies investigated the country specific bank 
lending channel such as, [Aysan et al. (2017), Ergec and Arslan (2013), and Macit 
(2012)] for Turkey, [Caporale et al. (2016), Akhatova (2016), Asbeig and Kassim 
(2015) and Hasin and Majid (2015)] for Malaysia, Sukmana (2015), Ben Amar et al. 
(2015) and Zaheer (2013) respectively for Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 
Such studies consensually arrived at the similar conclusion using different sample 
periods that monetary policy shocks affect the lending of the Islamic banks similar 
to that in the conventional banks. 
In a nutshell, Aysan et al. (2017) found that in Turkey, bank lending decreases 
with the increase in the policy rate because depositor move their deposit to higher 
return offering banks. These authors also observed that responses of deposits 
and credits to monetary shocks were larger for Islamic banks. Similarly, for 
Turkey, Macit (2012) reported a difference in response between conventional and 
participation banks to monetary policy shocks using quarterly loan growth. In this 
study, the participation banks showed larger reaction to monetary policy. In terms 
of bank specific variables, however, banks with higher liquidity ratio tend to had 
higher loan growth whereas banks with larger asset size had smaller loan growth.
In case of Malaysia, Hasin and Majid (2015) confirmed that Islamic banking 
was not spared from the interest rate and monetary conditions of the country. 
Moreover, both Akhatova (2016) and Caporale et al. (2016) found a significant 
response from conventional bank credit and Islamic bank financing to monetary 
policy shocks. However, the dynamic behavior of Islamic banks following 
Figure 2.
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monetary policy shocks, as well as other shocks, appears to be different. On the 
contrary, Asbeig and Kassim (2015) found that changes in the monetary policy 
had no significant impact on the level of financing extended by the Islamic and 
conventional banks. However, bank-specific factors, namely size and liquidity 
influenced the lending behavior of both the Islamic and conventional banks, 
whereas capitalization was relevant only for the Islamic banks. 
Sukmana (2015) examined the sensitivity of the economic sectors in response to 
the change in the Islamic and conventional monetary policy rate in the Indonesian 
economy. Their results indicated that the Islamic banks play important roles in 
channeling the monetary transmission. Both Hasin and Majid (2015) and Sukmana 
(2015) confirmed that specific economic sectors react differently to the Islamic 
and conventional monetary instruments. Ben Amar et al. (2015) investigated the 
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in Saudi Arabia’s Islamic banks and 
reported that bank lending channel is relatively effective in influencing non-oil 
private output, but less effective in influencing consumer prices. Zaheer (2013) 
also analyzed the differences in banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks across 
conventional and Islamic banks in Pakistan by incorporating bank size, liquidity, 
and type. Their result showed that Islamic banks cut their lending less than other 
small banks with liquid balance sheets, following a monetary contraction.
Though bank lending was the most anticipated channel for transmission of the 
policy shocks in Islamic banks, a large number of studies [Chong and Liu (2009), 
Ergec and Arslan (2013), Khan (2010), Hasin and Majid (2015), Akhatova (2016), 
Husin (2015), Zaheer (2013) and Husman (2015)] documented that Islamic banks 
functioning is noticeably influenced by interest rate changes. As Khatat (2016) 
argued, the Islamic banks may become conduit to the conventional monetary 
transmission in presence of well-developed interest rate channel but less developed 
Islamic financial system. The subsequent section discusses a number of studies 
arguing for the influence of interest rate on the retail pricing of Islamic banks.  
For example, Chong and Liu (2009), Husman (2015) and Husin (2015) assessed 
the influence of the interest rate on the rent/profit on Islamic lending/deposit 
using interest rate channel of the monetary policy. Specifically, Chong and Liu 
(2009) found influence of the interest rate on the volume of lending/deposits of 
the Islamic banks in Malaysia. Their study indicated that only a negligible portion 
of Islamic bank financing is strictly PLS based. Moreover, they concluded that 
Islamic deposits were not interest-free, but were closely pegged to conventional 
deposits rates. Husin (2015) measured the pace and magnitude of transmission via 
profit rate channel for Islamic banks versus interest rate channel of conventional 
banks. They indicated that the pass-through to Islamic banks was high and 
sizable. Husman (2015) also compared the monetary transmission through Islamic 
and conventional banks by investigating how a particular bank asset portfolio 
determined the equilibrium rate of return on loans and on deposits. Their results 
showed no significant difference in responses of the two types of banks to the 
central bank policy rate. However, the difference becomes apparent and significant 
after excluding Islamic windows from the sample. 
The survey indicates a broader consensus that the Islamic banks behave 
similar to the conventional banks on facing policy shock. On the question; why 
Islamic banks functioning is unexpectedly influenced by the interest rates, Weill 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 2, 2019 297
(2011) observed that the Islamic banks in general have a lower market power than 
conventional banks which affect their ability to influence the price of products 
when competing with their conventional counterparts. Ariss (2010) using different 
measures of competition also concluded that Islamic banking was less competitive 
compared to their conventional counterpart. It was not surprising to them that the 
price setting behavior of Islamic banks were mimicking the conventional banks 
in competitive environment. Khan (2010), Ming-Hua Liu (2009) and Obaidullah 
(2005) argued that Islamic financial institutions face “withdrawal risk” in deposit 
market had it offered lower rate of return compared to what its competitor paid. 
This situation was not very different from the loan market where Islamic banks 
were competing with the conventional banks for winning market share. 
Kuran (1993) predicted long ago that the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection would force Islamic Banks to look alike the conventional ones. 
El Gamal (2006) also argued that the Islamic financial markets had to deal with the 
allocation of financial credit and risk similar to conventional financial markets and 
consequently, due to this functional necessity, will mimic conventional finance as 
closely as possible. 
Additionally, the literature on Islamic transmission mechanism has 
documented the degree of sensitivity of Islamic finance to the interest rate. Ergec 
and Arslan (2013) and Kassim et al., (2009) argued that the Islamic banks were 
more sensitive to the changes in interest rates compared to the conventional banks 
because they were operating in shallow financial markets. Sukmana and Kassim 
(2010), found that Islamic deposits responded negatively to the shock in interest 
rates in Malaysia. 
Despite the consensus on the effect of policy shock, the literature is in less 
agreement on the impact of the excess liquidity present in the Islamic banks on 
their price setting behavior. A salient feature of Islamic banks around the world 
is that they are often surplus in liquidity. Khatat (2016) notes that the prohibition 
on interest rates; insufficient sterilization; lack of Sharia-compliant assets and 
insufficiently developed Islamic financial markets are the key reasons for this 
surplus liquidity. Though literature on conventional transmission mechanism has 
documented the deleterious effect of excess liquidity, this assessment for Islamic 
bank remains overdue as empirical research on this topic is clearly missing. Iqbal 
and Molyneux (2005) asserted that “excess liquidity” was not a correct way of 
characterizing Islamic financial institutions since they cannot turn to the interbank 
market or to the central bank to borrow short-term funds on facing a temporary 
liquidity crunch, as these are interest-based transactions. Therefore, the institutions 
have to have greater liquidity than non-Islamic ones. On the contrary, Iqbal (1998) 
suggested that only 6 Islamic banking scholars said that “excess Liquidity” was 
“not a problem” when 60 of them surveyed. Moreover, 28 of 60 surveyed felt that 
the excess liquidity was a serious problem for some or all Islamic banks.
Very few studies opted to work on the spillover effect between the conventional 
and the Islamic banks. Notably, Ergec and Arslan (2013) argue that returns of 
Islamic bank deposits are likely to be affected by interest rates of conventional 
deposits. Bacha (2004), Chong and Liu (2009) and Cevik and Charap (2011) find 
causality between return on Islamic deposits and conventional deposit rates. The 
findings in these studies indicate that Islamic bank return rates are affected by 
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conventional deposit rates. Moreover, empirical result of Ben Amar et al. (2015) 
suggest that though conventional and Islamic banks react to each other, the reaction 
of conventional banks to a shock on the financing provided by Islamic banks 
seems to be more significant than the reaction of Islamic banks to a shock on the 
conventional banks credit. Therefore, our study makes an important contribution 
by studying the price spillover between the two systems and impact of excess 
liquidity on the price setting behavior and its spillover between the conventional 
and Islamic banks.
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data
This study uses monthly data from January 2004 to October 2016. For practical 
purposes, excess liquidity is reported as a ratio of excess fund, including 
eligible securities with banks, above what is required statutorily to the time and 
demand liabilities of the banks. Mohanty (2006) advocates for including short 
term government securities in definition of excess liquidity, which is also being 
practiced by the most of the central bank.18 
Figure 3.
Weighted Average Lending Rates
18. Data Note 1 on the details the usefulness of this definition is available at the working paper version 
of this paper, available at: http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/wpapers/2018/wp100.pdf  
19. Working paper version provides more detail of the issue in Data Note 2. The working paper is 
available at:  http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/wpapers/2018/wp100.pdf
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A consistent series of net time and demand liabilities was available from 
December 2005 only. Fragmented and inconsistent information on this variable 
was available for a few months before December 2005.19 For example, data from 
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23rd April 2005 to 24th December 2005 was missing. Missing data were reconstructed 
using liquidity ratio. Liquidity ratio was regularly reported by the central bank for 
individual banks and as a banking sector aggregate. This ratio was defined as the 
liquidity maintained in specified proportion to the time and the demand liabilities. 
Following the practice in literature, this study used the 6-month repo rate as a 
proxy for the SBP policy rate. 
Lending and Deposit Rates 
Weighted average lending and deposit rates are acquired separately for Islamic 
and conventional banks from State Bank of Pakistan. SBP publishes aggregate 
weighted average lending and the deposit rates for the banking sector of Pakistan, 
without identifying the conventional and Islamic banks. Structurally, Islamic 
banks are different from the conventional banks and the price setting mechanism 
in the two sectors should be different, at least theoretically. However, the aggregate 
retail rates reported by SBP masked the varying dynamics of the retail pricing in 
the two systems. 
For example, Islamic banks initially offered discounted lending rate compared 
to the conventional banks to increase their market share (see Figure 3). However, 
as the Islamic finance quickly developed as an alternate mode, these banks 
started lending at higher rates compared to their peers. There could be a number 
of factors such as, expected interest rate risk, stringent regulatory requirements, 
lack of benchmark for lending and technical and management skills could have 
contributed to this change in the pricing behavior. 
Figure 4.
Weighted Average Deposits Rates
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This situation is not very different from the deposit rate. Initially, Islamic banks 
were offering a higher deposit rates to woo the depositors however as the industry 
matured over the years, the premium on the deposit rate started to decline. 
Currently, Islamic banks are taking deposits at discount (conventional rate minus 
Islamic rate is negative) compared to that offered by the conventional banks (see 
Figure 4).  Notably, SBP remained the prime source of data of this research. 
3.2. Methodology
This study has adopted a more practical approach and assumed that the policy 
shocks affect the retail rates significantly, either directly (direct effect), when a 
bank changes its retail rates perceiving a positive policy shock will increase its 
borrowing cost.20 And/or indirectly (indirect effect), when a policy shock forces 
banks to manage their excess liquidity more efficiently resulting in an increase 
in the interbank lending rate. The retail lending and the deposit rates respond 
eventually. However, if demand for loanable funds is weak, fearing slowdown 
in the retail business, excess liquidity held by banks may prevent them from 
increasing the lending rate in proportion to the policy shock, (Omer et.al, 2015). 
Interbank liquidity, therefore, plays a role of ‘mediator’ as it mediates the indirect 
relationship between the policy shocks and the retail rates. 
The variables involved in the model were subjected to unit root tests to 
ascertain the data generating process. The results, which will be discussed in 
Section 6, suggest that all the variables were following differenced stationary 
process. Therefore, Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) methodology, 
as given by the Equation (1), is used for estimation of the long run relationship 
between the variables. 
(1)
20. Recently, Jamilov and Égert (2014) have also used similar approach. 
In equation (1),  is the vector of regressors , where  is the retail 
rates and  includes explanatory variables such as policy rate and the excess 
liquidity, where necessary;  is a loading vector and measures the speed of 
adjustment; b is the cointegration vector;  short run adjustment coefficients and; 
n is the number of lags chosen using information criteria. As for the existence of a 
long run, relationship  must be significantly different from zero. The coefficient 
b shows the long run relationship between the regressors. In this context b 
= 1, indicates a complete pass through of regressors to the dependent variable 
provided both  and  have same unit of measurement. Alternatively, b < 1 
implies incomplete pass through. 
The long run VECM coefficient provides estimate of the pass-through of 
the policy rate. When excess liquidity is included as a regressor, its coefficient 
is less meaningful in quantifying its impact on the pass though of the policy 
rate, as the former becomes a conduit to the transmission of policy between the 
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two regressors. A change in the policy rate is likely to affect the excess liquidity 
holdings of the banks, at least theoretically, while disturbing their retail rates. 
Therefore, previously, a negative sign with the liquidity coefficient is used as a 
qualitative indicator of its impeding effect on the pass through of the policy rate. 
This study aims to first quantify the impact of excess liquidity on pass-through 
of the policy rate to the retail rates using mediator approach. The mediator or 
indirect effect, in this research, is estimated using the long run b coefficient from 
VECM (see Figure 5).21 
Mediating Effect
(2)
(3)
(4)The mediator effect: 
21. If the direction is known a priori, one can estimate the long run relationship using Dynamic OLS 
procedure.
22. In Sobel (1982) approach, mediator effect is calculated as . Despite differences, the 
results of the two approaches are very similar.
Figure 5.
Excess Liquidity with Mediator Effect
Policy rate
Excess Liquidity 
(Mediator)
Lending/Deposit 
rates
Direct Eﬀect
Indirect or 
Mediator Eﬀect
Literature documented two approaches, Judd and Kenny (1981) and Sobel 
(1982), for estimating mediator or indirect effect. This study benefits from Judd 
and Kenny (1981)’s approach for its simplicity. In this approach, impact of excess 
liquidity (mediator effect shown by Equation 4) is estimated by differencing the 
coefficients of the key policy variable (i.e., policy rate), when the excess liquidity is 
included in (Equation 2) and then excluded (Equation 3) from the model, as shows 
below.22 
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Interestingly, estimation of impact of the excess liquidity on the spillover 
between the retail rates of the two systems is more complicated as nature of excess 
liquidity present in such systems is very different. Therefore, a more holistic 
moderated-mediation approach is used to capture the impact of excess liquidity 
on the price spillover between the two systems. 
Moderated-Mediation Effect
A moderator is a variable that may strengthen or weaken an economic relationship 
between two variables.23 In a more complicated setting, a mediator variable can 
be moderated by another variable that may or may not be similar in nature. A 
moderated-mediation is, therefore, a process where economic relationship 
between the two variables is mediated by a third variable, while performance of 
the mediator itself is influenced by some other moderator variable. 
For example, the relationship between the retail lending rates of the two 
systems is influenced by the excess liquidities present in the two systems, involving 
different dynamics (see Figure 6). Existing literature is not very helpful in guiding 
mediation or moderation nature of these excess liquidity in intermediation 
between the retail rates. For simplicity, this study assumes one of these liquidities 
acts as a mediator while other act as a moderator while transmitting the shock 
between the retail rates of the two system. 
Assuming that variables W and M respectively are moderator and mediator 
(both being excess liquidities in the two systems) for explaining the relationship 
between the retail rates (say X and Y or policy and retail rates) of the two systems, the 
mediation-moderation effect can be obtained from long run coefficients obtained 
from Equation (1), as shown by Equation (7). It provides the quantitative impact of 
excess liquidity on the price spillover between the Islamic and conventional banks. 
Figure 6.
Excess Liquidities in Moderated Mediation
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Excess Liquidity
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23. A basic moderator effect can be represented as an interaction between a focal independent variable 
and a factor that specifies the appropriate conditions for its operation.
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IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
As indicated earlier, the variables are subjected to the unit root tests. The results 
are provided in Table A3 in Appendix. Since variables involved were differenced 
stationary, VECM applied to estimate both the long run relationship and short 
run dynamics. This study, however, focuses mainly on the long run pass-through, 
as policy shocks are expected to bring permanent change in the nominal retail 
variables. 
Table 1 and Table 2 shows the long run pass-through of the policy rate to 
the retail rates for the conventional and Islamic banks, respectively in a nested 
setting i.e., by excluding and then including excess liquidity. No. of lags, in the 
tables, indicate the optimal lags selected using Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria. The 
number of CE indicates the number of cointegrating relationship identified by 
Johanson’s Rank test, the details of which can be provided on request. Most of the 
models appear to have one cointegration relationship, except model (6) and (12). 
Both models include excess liquidity, which makes presence of two-cointegration 
relationship possible. 
The upper panels of the tables describe the estimates of the error correction 
coefficient. A significant coefficient suggests that the long run relationship exists 
between the variables, where dependent variable adjusts toward equilibrium in 
response to the shock to the system. The lower panels of the tables show estimates 
of the long run relationship. ‘Liquidity effect’, at the bottom of the tables, indicates 
the mediation effect of excess liquidity on the pass-through of the policy shock to 
the retail rates. The results of the diagnostic tests, provided in Table A4 in Appendix 
A2, suggest that residuals of the estimated models are mostly uncorrelated, 
however they are not normally distributed, which is expected given the small size 
of the sample.24 Moreover, test for stability of the selected model suggests that the 
number of stationary cointegration equation correctly identified. In the following 
sub-section, estimated results are discussed separately for the conventional banks, 
Islamic banks, and spillover effect of price between the two banking systems. 
Monetary Policy Pass-Through in Conventional Banks
Table 1 shows the pass-through of the policy rate to the retail rates for conventional 
banks in a nested setting where excess liquidity was dropped initially [models 
i.e., (1) & (3)] and included later [models (2) & (4)]. Interestingly, the estimates 
(5)
(6)
(7)Indirect effect:
24. Presence of serial correlation is tested using Portmanteau Q-statistic using 12 lags. The null 
hypothesis of the test is; residuals are not serially correlated. The normality test is conducted using 
Shapiro-Wilk test. The null hypothesis for test is that the residuals are normally distributed. Eigen 
Value (EV) Stability test indicates whether the number of cointegrating equations is misspecified or 
whether the cointegrating equations, which are assumed to be stationary, are not stationary.
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of model (1), pinpointing the policy and lending rate relationship, indicates that 
the adjustment coefficient of the former is significant while that of the latter is 
insignificant, at five percent level. This result suggests that the policy rate, instead 
of the lending rate, adjusts significantly towards equilibrium in response to the 
shock to the system. Previous studies, e.g., Fazal and Salam (2013), Hanif and 
Khan (2012) and SBP (2005) using aggregate data, reported a significant impact 
of the policy rate on the lending rate. Perhaps, evolving dynamics of the Islamic 
banks, included in the aggregate data, may have contributed to this deviation 
from the earlier result. Therefore, an aggregate picture of pass-through may not be 
very reliable if objective is to bring policy change in the conventional banks alone. 
As conventional banks preferred risk free securities in wake of strong borrowing 
demand from government, their lending becomes less dependent on the policy 
rate. Possibly, conventional bank anticipates a change in the policy rate a priori 
due to their focus on the government borrowing, and in response, they proactively 
change their retail lending rate ex ante. 
Table 1.
Discount Rate’s Long Run Pass-Through to Retail Rates of Conventional Banks
Dependent Variable Lending Rate Deposit Rate
Model # 1 2 3 4
No. of CE 1 1 1 1
No. of Lags 3 3 2 1
CE_(lending/Deposit rate) -0.0115 -0.0468* -0.0759* -.07694*
[0.574] [0.019] 0 [0.000]
CE_Policy rate 0.2205* 0.1632* 0.0979 -0.0574
[0.003] [0.029] [0.149] [0.150]
CE_Excess Liquidity 0.1203 -0.1044
[0.720] [0.535]
Policy Rate 0.855* 0.8140* 0.6099* 0.5882*
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Excess Liquidity -0.0371* -0.0632*
[0.009] [0.003]
Liquidity Effect 0.0107** 0.0162
[0.069] [0.106]
Number of lag selected using HQ criteria. P-values are in parenthesis. * and ** shows 5-, and 10- percent level of significance. No. 
of CE shows the number of cointegrating relationship identified by Johanson’s Rank test. No. of lags indicates the optimal number 
of lags selected using Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria. Both lending and the deposit rates, we used nested models when excess 
liquidity was dropped initially from the model (i.e., Model (1) & (3)) and later included (models (2) & (4)). Liquidity effect shows 
the Mediation Effect.
However, when the effect of excess liquidity is controlled as shown in model 
(2), transmission of policy shock reappears in both directions indicating that both 
lending and policy rates adjust toward the long run equilibrium in wake of the 
shock given to the system. The lending rate falls back while policy rate moving 
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up towards the new equilibrium. Almost 0.81 percentage point of the shock to 
the system passes to the lending rate in the long run in a liquidity controlled 
environment.
Models (3) and (4) indicate pass-through of the policy rate to the deposit rate. 
The estimates suggest that the deposit rate adjusts in response to the shock to 
the system, independent of the presence of the excess liquidity. Imposition of the 
regulatory deposit rate, benchmarked with the policy rate, has strengthened the 
direction of the pass-through to the deposit rate.25 Estimates of the lower panel 
suggest that almost 0.60 percentage point of the monetary policy shock passes to 
the deposit rate in the long run. Moreover, negative signs with this coefficient of 
the excess liquidity [in Models (2) & (4)] suggest that it impedes the pass-through 
of the policy rate in the conventional system.
Our results on lending and deposit rate pass-though is not very different from 
that reported in the available literature on Pakistan (Table A5 in Appendix).26 The 
marginal difference is driven not only by the variation in time but also the data 
definition used. Earlier studies have used aggregate retail rates of the banking 
sector while this study has used information specific to the conventional and the 
Islamic banks. 
Interestingly the coefficient for the ‘liquidity effect’ at the bottom of the table, 
quantifying its impact, is found weakly significant. This result suggests that excess 
liquidity is mediating the policy rate’s pass-through to the retail rates, though 
its impact is weak. Around one percentage point of the shock passes through 
excess liquidity to retail rates. The impact is clearer for the lending rate than the 
deposit rate primarily due to the conventional banks substantial investment in the 
government securities. 
Monetary Policy Pass-Through in Islamic banks
Table 2 pinpoints the pass-through of the policy rate to the returns (on financing 
and investment) in the Islamic banks. Estimates of Model (5) suggest that 
both return on financing (or lending rate) and the policy rate adjust towards 
equilibrium. However, when excess liquidity is controlled [in Model (6)], only 
return on financing adjusts towards long run equilibrium. The estimates of the 
long run relationship at the lower panel of the table suggests that almost 0.84 
percentage point of unit shock to the system passes to the return on financing 
(lending rate) in the long run, which increases to 0.92 percentage point in liquidity 
controlled environment. This results show that the pass through of the policy rate 
to the return on Islamic financing is not similar to conventional banks. In the latter, 
the pass-through was not detected between the policy and retail rates until excess 
liquidity present in the system was controlled. The influence of policy rate on the 
Islamic bank’s financing rate is not unexpected as the central bank’s regulation 
25. SBP imposed regulatory deposit rate on conventional banks from June 01 2008 to improve the pass-
through to the deposit rate. SBP linked the minimum deposit rate, to be paid to a depositor, with 
SBP repo rate.   
26. We borrowed Table A5, in Appendix, from Omer (2016) which summarizes the available literature 
on monetary policy pass-through of policy rates to the retail rates, in Pakistan.
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forces the Islamic banks to benchmark their lending with the KIBOR (see Chapter 
2 for details). 
Model (7) and (8) shows the estimates of pass-through for the return on 
investments (deposit rate) in Islamic banks. The estimates of upper panel suggest 
that both policy rate and the return on investment (deposit rate) significantly 
adjust towards the equilibrium in response to the shock to system, independent 
of the presence of excess liquidity. Estimates of the long run relationship in the 
lower panel of the table suggest that almost 0.57 percentage point of the shock to 
the policy rate passes to the return on investment (deposit rate). Not surprisingly, 
the relationship between the return (deposit rate) and the policy rate in Islamic 
banking system is similar to the conventional banking system despite the fact 
that the price setting mechanism is completely different in the two systems. In 
conventional banks it is driven by the interest based regulatory requirement, 
while in Islamic system deposit rate is driven by the philosophy of profit sharing. 
Moreover, similar to the conventional system, sign of long run excess liquidity 
coefficients are negative indicating that it impedes the pass-through of the policy 
rate on the returns on investment however, its impact is surprisingly insignificant. 
Table 2.
Discount Rate’s Long run Pass-Through to Returns in Islamic Banks
Dependent Variable Financing (Lending rate) Investment (Deposit Rate) 
Model # 5 6 7 8
No. of CE 1 2 1 1
No. of Lags 7 1 2 1
CE_(Financing/Invetment rate) -0.1576* -0.1632* -0.1057* -0.1684*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.025] [0.000]
CE_Policyrate -0.1162* -0.0417 0.2563* 0.1609**
[0.005] [0.309] [0.004] [0.060]
CE_Excess Liquidity 0.5475* 0.0045
[0.033] [0.993]
Policy rate 0.8376* 0.9208* 0.5776* 0.5685*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Excess liquidity -0.0127 -0.0095
[0.366] [0.291]
Liquidity Effect 0.018 -0.0064
[0.284] [0.344]
Number of lag selected using HQ criteria. P-values are in parenthesis. * and ** shows 5-, and 10- percent level of significance. No. 
of CE shows the number of cointegrating relationship identified by Johanson’s Rank test. No. lags indicate the optimal number 
of lags selected using Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria. Both for lending and the deposit rates, we used nested models when excess 
liquidity was dropped initially from the model (i.e., Model (1) & (3)) and later included (models (2) & (4). Liquidity effect shows 
the Mediation Effect. 
At the bottom of the table, liquidity effect showing the long run mediation 
by excess liquidity is found insignificant. This result suggests that the presence 
of excess liquidity and its impact on the Islamic pass-through is mostly myth. 
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Perhaps, Islamic banks have to manage their excess liquidity more efficiently 
as they do not enjoy the luxury of parking the excess reserve in government 
securities. Moreover, as suggested by Iqbal and Molyneux (2005), excess liquidity 
with the Islamic banks may not be ‘in excess’ given their intrinsic risk sharing 
structure and their limitation to turn to the interbank market or to the central bank 
to borrow short-term funds in case of a temporary liquidity crunch. Therefore, 
a general understanding of structure of the Islamic financial system and excess 
liquidity with them need to be improved significantly. Our result on the policy 
rate’s pass-through in the Islamic bank is the first for Pakistan. However, our 
result finds support from [Chong and Liu (2009), Ergec and Arslan (2013), Khan 
(2010), Hasin and Majid (2015), Akhatova (2016), Husin (2015), Zaheer (2013) and 
Husman (2015)].
Spillover Effect of Price between the Islamic and Conventional Banks
Table 3 shows the spillover effect of retail prices (lending rate versus return on 
financing, and deposit rate versus returns on investment) between conventional 
and Islamic banking systems. Model (9) in Table 3 shows the long run relationship 
between the lending rates of conventional banks and return on investment of 
Islamic banks. The adjustment coefficients in the upper panel demonstrate that the 
return on financing adjusts to the shock to the equilibrium relationship between 
them. If the price system receives a shock, say by increase in the lending rate of the 
conventional banks, Islamic banks follow the conventional banks in pricing their 
lending products. 
Islamic banks are relatively new phenomenon in the global financial landscape, 
which was previously dominated by the conventional banks. The fact that the 
Islamic banks follow the conventional banks in pricing the lending products is not 
surprising and confirms the findings of previous studies. Almost 0.97 percentage 
point of shock to the lending rate of conventional banks, shown in the lower panel 
of Table 3 [Model (9)], passes to the rate of return on financing from Islamic banks 
in the long run. 
Surprisingly, the pass-through between the deposit rate and return on 
investment is not similar to that of the lending instruments, as shown in the upper 
panel of Table 3 [Model (11)]. In contrast, the result suggests that any shock to the 
deposit rate system leads to adjustment in the conventional bank deposit rate, 
instead of adjustment in return in investment of Islamic banks. Thus, in pricing 
deposit products, Islamic banks appear to have acquired the status of leaders, 
while the conventional banks have become followers. The response of conventional 
banks to the shock to the deposit system suggests that they, instead of the Islamic 
banks, suffer from the ‘deposit withdrawal risk’ contrary to the suggestion of 
Khan (2010) and others. Such an impact is also surprising given the conventional 
deposit rate is an administered rate. Administrative rate refers to lower bound for 
the deposit rate to be offered by conventional banks to the depositors. Perhaps, 
conventional banks are also focusing on the competitive Islamic deposit rate, 
besides offering the administrative rate. The Islamic banks are exempted from 
paying administered deposit rate.
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Intuitively, Islamic banks raises deposit on religious ground on promise that 
return on the investment will be in compliance with the Sharia requirement, which 
appeals people with religious inclination. Introduction of Islamic banks, therefore, 
channeled the savings of those who stayed away from banking system on interest 
prohibition. Therefore, Islamic banks should be credited with increasing the 
financial inclusion in the economy. Literature on economic growth suggests that 
increased financial inclusion leads to higher economic growth and lower income 
inequality in a society in the long run. Consequently, Islamic banks will promote 
economic growth and help mitigate the income inequality in the society. 
Our result suggests that religion’s connotation handed Islamic banks advantage 
in pricing deposit products, which also explains the lower return paid recently 
by the Islamic banks on investments (see Figure 3). The estimates of the lower 
panel suggest that the spillover between the two deposit rates is very strong and 
complete. More precisely, any shock to the return on investment in Islamic banks 
leads to a similar increase in the deposit rate of the conventional banks. 
Besides the strong spillover between the prices, the results also demonstrate 
very strong effect of excess liquidities on the retail rates of the two system. For 
example, the result of Model (10) shows that any increase in the excess liquidity 
of the Islamic banks, say by one percentage point, decreases Islamic financing 
rate by 0.24 percentage point in the long run. However, if excess liquidity with 
the conventional banks increases with similar margin, the return on Islamic 
financing increases by 0.21 percentage point. Increase in the conventional excess 
liquidity means increased stock of government securities, which conventional 
banks accumulate to earn higher risk free return. As Islamic banks have limited 
investment opportunities, the conventional bank investment in the government 
securities is perhaps supplemented by the liquidity from the Islamic banks. This 
drain in the Islamic liquidity increases the return on financing in Islamic banks. 
Similarly, the result of Model (12) suggests that increase in the excess liquidity 
with the conventional banks, say by one percentage point, deceases the deposit rate 
of the conventional banks marginally, by 0.03 percentage point. On the contrary, 
one percent increase in the Islamic excess liquidity leads to 0.01 percentage point 
increase in the deposit rate of the conventional banks. Perhaps, a higher flow of 
deposits to the Islamic banks induces the conventional banks to raise their deposit 
rate. 
Table 3.
Retail Rates Rate’s Long run Pass-Through between the Conventional and Islamic Banks
Dependent Variable Lending (Financing) Rate Deposit (Investment) Rate 
Model # 9 10 11 12
No. of CE 1 1 1 2
No. of Lags 3 2 2 1
CE_(Financing/Investment) 0.1563* 0.0172 0.1216 0.1317**
[0.001] [0.251] [0.139] [0.070]
CE_Excess_Isl -1.0231* -0.2018
[0.000] [0.813]
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The ‘liquidity effect’, reported at the bottom of the Table 3, indicates a 
mediatory role played by the liquidities in pricing of retail products. In absence of 
any guiding theory or literature, it is assumed that one of the liquidities is acting 
as a mediator while the other is acting as a moderator. The role of the liquidities is 
reversed to obtain a statistically significant relationship. The coefficients reported 
are liquidity effects only for the mediator variables. 
For example, in model (10), the liquidity effect under excess liquidity of Islamic 
bank is significant at five percent level. This result indicates that when excess 
liquidity of Islamic banks is mediating (and excess liquidity of conventional bank 
is moderating), as almost 0.12 percentage point of the shock to the conventional 
lending rate passes to the return of Islamic financing, through the Islamic liquidity. 
When the role of the liquidity is reversed, i.e., excess liquidity of the conventional 
banks become mediator and that of Islamic banks becomes moderator, their impact 
become insignificant. 
Dependent Variable Lending (Financing) Rate Deposit (Investment) Rate 
Model # 9 10 11 12
No. of CE 1 1 1 2
No. of Lags 3 2 2 1
CE_(lending/Deposit rate) 0.0084 0.0029 -0.1853* -0.2258*
[0.702] [0.694] [0.000] [0.000]
CE_Excess_Con 0.1115 0.188
[0.341] [0.739]
Islamic Financing /Investment 1.0248* 1.0196*
[0.000] [0.000]
Con_Lending/Deposit rate 0.9657* 0.9854*
[0.000] [0.000]
ExcessLiquidity_Islamic -0.2421* 0.0117**
[0.000] [0.081]
ExcessLiquidity_Con 0.2061* -0.0292*
[0.000] [0.001]
Liquidity Effect
Excess_con -0.0003 0.0200**
[0.911] [0.044]
Excess_Islamic -0.1182* -0.0062
[0.000] [0.808]
Number of lag selected using HQ criteria. P-values are in parenthesis. * and ** shows 5-, and 10- percent level of significance. No. 
of CE shows the number of cointegrating relationship identified by Johanson’s Rank test. No. lags indicate the optimal number 
of lags selected using Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria. Both for lending and the deposit rates, we used nested models when excess 
liquidity was dropped initially from the model (i.e., Model (1) & (3)) and later included (models (2) & (4). Liquidity effect shows 
the Moderated -Mediation Effect. 
Table 3.
Retail Rates Rate’s Long run Pass-Through between the Conventional and Islamic Banks
(Continued)
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Moreover, in model (12), the results demonstrate that the conventional excess 
liquidity mediates the spillover of the shock between the deposit rates of the 
systems, while the Islamic excess liquidity moderates this relationship. Almost, 
0.02 percent of the shock to the deposit rate system passes to the conventional 
deposit rate through conventional excess liquidity. 
Is there any relationship between the excess liquidities?
As discussed earlier, the excess liquidity plays crucial role in transmitting price 
shock between the two systems. A natural question arises: how are the liquidities 
related? It should be noted that any bi-directional relationship between the two 
liquidity is not expected by the Sharia scholars as well as the financial regulator 
due to Sharia restriction.  
Table 4.
Long run Relationship b/w Conventional and Islamic liquidity
No. of CE 1
No. of Lags 1
CE_Excess_Conventional -0.0800*
[0.016]
CE_Excess_Islamic 0.1695*
[0.001]
Excess_Conventional 1.000
Excess_Islamic 0.9184*
[0.000]
Trend 0.0525* 
[0.030]
P-values are in parenthesis. * and ** shows 5-, and 10- percent level of significance. No. of CE shows 
the number of cointegrating relationship identified by Johanson’s Rank test. No. lags indicate the 
optimal number of lags selected using Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criteria.
Table 4 pinpoints the cointegration relationship between two liquidities. The 
upper panel of the table suggests that the liquidities in both systems adjust toward 
the long run equilibrium when the system is subjected to a shock. More precisely, 
excess liquidity with the conventional banks falls back while that of the Islamic 
banks rises to attain the long run equilibrium if the system receives a shock. 
The long-run relationship at the lower panel of the Table 4 suggests that any 
shock to excess liquidity of the Islamic banks leads to almost 0.92 percentage 
point increase in the excess liquidity of the conventional banks in the long run. 
Such a one-on-one relationship is not anticipated as Islamic liquidity inflows to 
conventional system is not expected though conventional banks are allowed to 
invest in the Islamic banking instruments. Interestingly, the process of adjustment 
is slower for the conventional banks compared to the Islamic banks perhaps due 
to their huge asset size.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This study investigated the comparative pass-through of the policy rate to the 
retail prices, spillover between the prices of the Islamic and the conventional 
banking systems, and impact of excess liquidity on the relationships using Vector 
Error Correction Mechanism (VECM), on data from January 2004 to October 2016, 
acquired from State Bank of Pakistan. Moreover, this study also assessed the 
quantitative impact of the excess liquidity on the pass-through and the spillovers of 
prices using mediator- moderator approach. The results of this research contribute 
to existing literature in a number of ways. 
First, the results of this research suggest that the monetary policy shock affects 
the retail prices of the Islamic banks similar to the conventional banks, confirming 
the findings of the earlier studies on this subject. Moreover, our result suggests that 
there is a strong spillover between the retail prices of the two systems. Precisely, 
any shock to the loan price system (between lending rate of conventional banks 
and return on Islamic financing) leads to almost similar increase in return on 
financing (lending rate) of the Islamic banks. A shock to the deposit price system 
(between deposit rate of conventional banks and returns on investment from 
Islamic banks) leads to 0.60 percentage point increase in the deposit rate of the 
conventional banks. The results show that Islamic banks have acquired the status 
of the leader in pricing of the deposit products, where the conventional banks 
have become the follower. This is unexpected and stands in sharp contrast to the 
findings in literature, which generally depicts Islamic banks as less competitive, 
and follow the conventional banks in retail product’s price setting.
Intuitively, Islamic banks raise deposit on religious ground, complying 
Sharia requirements, which appeal people with religious inclination. Such people 
may have stayed away from banking on ground of riba (interest) prohibition. 
Introduction of Islamic banking, thus, may have helped in channeling these 
savings into the banking system. As a result, it also explains why Islamic banks 
continue to attract deposit recently, despite paying lower return on investments. 
Islamic banks, therefore, should be credited with the increasing the financial 
inclusion in Pakistan. Literature on economic growth suggests that increased 
financial inclusion leads to higher economic growth and lower income inequality 
in a society in the long run. Therefore, our results suggest that Islamic banks are 
promoting economic growth and helping in mitigating the income inequality in 
the society.
Second, the investigation into the impact of excess liquidity on the monetary 
policy pass-through suggests that the presence of excess liquidity impedes monetary 
policy pass-through in both systems, and significantly in the conventional system. 
Surprisingly, impact of excess liquidity is found insignificant for the Islamic 
banks contrary to contention in literature. Perhaps, Islamic banks manage their 
liquidity more efficiently, as they do not enjoy the luxury of parking their excess 
reserves in government securities. Therefore, argument by Iqbal and Molyneux 
(2005) finds support that Islamic excess liquidity may not be ‘an excess’ given their 
intrinsic risk sharing structure and their limitation to borrow short-term funds 
from interbank market or from the central bank on facing the temporary liquidity 
crunch. Therefore, a general understanding of structure of the Islamic financial 
system and excess liquidity with them need to be improved significantly.
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Third, though Islamic banks follow the conventional banks in pricing the 
lending products; the assessment of impact of excess liquidity on the price spillover 
highlights interesting pattern. Increase in the excess liquidity of the Islamic banks 
decreases, while that of the conventional banks increases the lending price of the 
Islamic banks. The positive impact of conventional excess liquidity on the Islamic 
lending price (rate) is intriguing and suggests that higher liquidity holding of the 
conventional bank is creating pressure upward pressure on the Islamic loan prices. 
It is possible only if increase in the conventional liquidity is causes a drain to the 
Islamic excess liquidity. It is important to note that the excess liquidity with the 
Islamic banks remains mostly in fungible cash reserves form with the central bank. 
On the contrary, the conventional excess liquidity remains mostly in the form of 
short-term government securities, as the central bank frequently intervenes in the 
interbank market and absorbs conventional cash liquidity through OMOs if this 
liquidity is favorable by the central bank. 
The results hint at the possibility of the liquidity transmission from Islamic 
banks to the interest based short-term government securities. Perhaps, Islamic 
banks are lending to the conventional banks through some unrevealed mechanism, 
which drains their liquidity, while conventional banks invest borrowed money 
into the interest based short term government securities, which results in increase 
in the conventional excess liquidity. Nevertheless, this indirect lending to the 
government may have improved overall efficiency of the financial sector in 
Pakistan.
This is also true for the deposit price system, where Islamic banks lead the 
conventional banks in pricing the deposit products. Any shock to excess liquidity 
of the Islamic banks decreases while that of the conventional banks increases the 
deposit rate of the conventional banks. Positive relationship between the excess 
liquidity of the Islamic banks and the deposit rates of the conventional banks 
shows that the conventional banks, instead of the Islamic banks, suffer from the 
‘deposit withdrawal risk’ contrary to the suggestion of Khan (2010) and others. 
Finally, the liquidity effect helps reveal the crucial dynamics of excess liquidity 
with strong policy implications. Though excess liquidity with the Islamic banks 
has no effect on the Islamic pass-through of the policy shocks, the liquidity effect 
reveals that it in fact mediates transmission of conventional price shock to the return 
on the Islamic finance. The strong mediatory effect of the Islamic excess liquidity 
in lending price transmission compared to notional effect of conventional liquidity 
on deposit price transmission highlights that Islamic excess liquidity, being highly 
liquid, has greater potential to affect the market conditions adversely. In effect, it 
also explains the recent swings witnessed in the interbank call market in Pakistan. 
Therefore, this situation demands more attention from the central bank as it has 
potential to dilute the intended impact of the monetary policy shock. Moreover, 
the unexpected presence of long run relationship between the excess liquidities of 
the two systems also points to this prospect where Islamic excess liquidity may 
have overriding impact on the conventional policy transmission going forwards, 
as the size of the Islamic banking system grows.  
Following caveats are in order. Islamic banks are relatively new, and their 
asset size is small compared to that of the conventional banks. This study did not 
account for the asset sizes of the two systems. Moreover, this study has limited its 
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scope assuming that the impact of a shock would be symmetric which may not be 
the case. Asymmetric response of the shock may be investigated in future research. 
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Jamilov, R., and B. Égert, (2014), “Interest Rate Pass-through and Monetary 
Policy Asymmetry: A Journey into the Caucasian Black Box”, Journal of Asian 
Economics, 31–32: 57–70. 
Judd, C. M., and D. A. Kenny, (1981), “Process Analysis: Estimating Mediation in 
Treatment  Evaluations”, Evaluation Review, 5: 602-619.
Kassim, S., M. A. Majid, and R. M. Yusof, (2009), “Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks 
on Conventional and Islamic Banks in a Dual Banking System: Evidence from 
Malaysia”, Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 30, 41–58.
Khan, F. (2008), “Islamic Banking by Judiciary: The ‘Backdoor’ for Islamism in 
Pakistan?”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 31(3): 535-555.
Khan, F., (2010), “How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking?”,Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization, 76: 805–820
Khatat, M. H. (2016), “Monetary Policy in the Presence of Islamic Banking”, IMF 
Working Paper #WP/16/72, IMF, Washington D.C. 
Khawaja, I., and S. Khan (2008), “Pass-through of Change in Policy Interest Rate to 
Market Rates”, The Pakistan Development Review, 47(4), pp.661–674.
Kuran, T., (1993), “The Economic Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism”, In: Marty, 
M.E., Appleby, R.S.  (Eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, 
Economies, and Militance. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 302–341.
Lucchetta, M. (2007), “What Do Data Say About Monetary Policy, Bank Liquidity 
and Bank Risk Taking?”, Economic Notes by Banca Monte deiPaschi di Siena SpA, 
36(2):189–203. 
Mohanty, M. S., G. Schnabel, and P. Garcia-Lima (2006), “Banks and Aggregate 
Credit: What is New?”, In: The Banking System in Emerging Economies: How 
much Progress has been Made? BIS Papers No.28. 
Mohsin, H.M. (2011), “Impact of Monetary Policy on Lending and Deposit Rates in 
Pakistan: Panel Data Analysis”, The Lahore Journal of Economics, 16, pp.199-213. 
Nissanke, M., and E. Aryeetey (1998), Financial Integration and Development: 
Liberalization and Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: Routledge, 
Obaidullah, M., (2005), Rating of Islamic Financial Institutions: Some 
Methodological Suggestions, Working Paper: Islamic Economics Research 
Centre, King Abdulaziz University.
Omer, M., J. de Haan, and B. Scholtens (2015), “An Empirical Analysis of Excess 
Interbank Liquidity: A Case Study of Pakistan”, Applied Economics, 47(44): 
4754-4776.
Omer, M. (2016), “Should Central Bank Forget Reserve Requirements? Assessment 
of Reserve Requirements in Transmitting SBP’s Policy Shocks to Retail Interest 
Rates and Exchange Rate”, SBP Working Paper Series No. 81, SBP, Karachi. 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 2, 2019 315
Ruffer, R., and L. Stracca (2006), “What is Global Excess Liquidity, and Does it 
Matter?”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 696. 
Qayyum, A., S. Khan, and I. Khawaja (2006), “Interest Rate Pass-through in Pakistan: 
Evidence from Transfer Function Approach”, The Pakistan Development Review, 
44(4 Part II), pp.975-1001.
Saxegaard, M. (2006) “Excess Liquidity and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy: 
Evidence from Sub- Saharan Africa”, Working Paper No. 06/115, IMF, 
Washington. 
SBP (2005), Performance of the Banking Sector, Pakistan: Financial Sector Assessment 
2005. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi.
SBP (2016), Quarterly Performance Review of the Banking Sector, Q3CY16, State Bank 
of Pakistan,  Karachi.
Sobel, M. E. (1982),” Asymptotic Confidence Intervals for Indirect Effects in 
Structural Equation  Models”, In S. Leinhardt (Ed.), Sociological Methodology 
1982 (pp. 290-312). Washington DC:  American Sociological Association.
Sørensen, C.K., and T. Werner (2006), “Bank Interest Rate Pass-through in the Euro 
Area: A Cross Country Comparison,” ECB Working Paper No. 580 
Sukmana, R. (2015), “Economic Sectors Sensitivity to Islamic and Conventional 
Monetary Instruments: Case Study in Indonesia”, In El-Karanshawy, H. A., A. 
Omar, T. Khan, S. S. Ali, H. Izhar, W. Tariq, K. Ginena, and B. Al Quradaghi 
(Eds.), Islamic Economics: Theory, Policy and Social Justice, Volume 2, Bloomsbury 
Qatar Foundation Journal: A member of Qatar Foundation. 
Sukmana, R. and S. H. Kassim, (2010), “Roles of the Islamic Banks in the Monetary 
Transmission Process in Malaysia,” International Journal of Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management, 3: 7–19.
Weill, L. (2011), “Do Islamic Banks Have Greater Market Power?”, Comparative 
Economic Studies. 53: 291–306.
Zaheer, S., S. Ongena, and S.J.G. van Wijnbergen, (2013), “The Transmission of 
Monetary Policy through Conventional and Islamic Banks”, International 
Journal of Central Banking, 9 (4): 175– 224.
Monetary Policy Pass-Through, Excess Liquidity and Price Spillover: A Comparative Study of 
Conventional and Islamic Banks of Pakistan316
APPENDIX
Table A1.
Group-wise Composition of Banks
As of September 2016
A. Public Sector Commercial Banks (5)
1  First Women Bank Ltd. 
2  National Bank of Pakistan
3  Sindh Bank Ltd. 
4  The Bank of Khyber 
5  The Bank of Punjab
B. Local Private Banks (22)
1  Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Ltd.
2  Allied Bank Ltd.
3 Askari Bank Ltd.
4  Bank AL Habib Ltd.
5  Bank Alfalah Ltd.
6 BankIslami Pakistan Ltd.
7 Burj Bank Ltd. 
8  Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Ltd.
9 Faysal Bank Ltd.
10  Habib Bank Ltd.
11  Habib Metropolitan Bank Ltd.
12  JS Bank Ltd.
13  MCB Bank Ltd. 
14 MCB Islamic Bank Ltd.
15 Meezan Bank Ltd.
16  NIB Bank Ltd.
17  SAMBA Bank Ltd.
18  Silk Bank Ltd
19 Soneri Bank Ltd.
20  Standard Chartered Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 
21  Summit Bank Ltd 
22  United Bank Ltd.
C. Foreign Banks (4) 
1  Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. 
2  Citibank N.A.
3  Deutsche Bank AG
4  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.
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Table A1.
Group-wise Composition of Banks (Continued)
Table A2.
Composition of Islamic Banking Institutions
As of September 2016
D. Specialized Banks (4)
1  Industrial Development Bank Ltd. 
2  Punjab Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd.
3  SME Bank Ltd.
4 ZaraiTaraqiati Bank Ltd.
All Commercial Banks (31)
     Include A + B + C
All Banks (35)
     Include A + B + C + D
Source: SBP (2016) 
Composition of Islamic Banking Institutions
Islamic Banks  
1 Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 
2 Bank Islami Pakistan Ltd.
3 Burj Bank Ltd.
4 Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Ltd
5 MCB Islamic Bank Ltd.
6 Meezan Bank Ltd
Conventional Banks having Islamic Banking Branches
1 Askari Bank Ltd.
2 Allied Bank Ltd.
3 Bank Al Habib Ltd
4 Bank Alfalah Ltd
5 Faysal Bank Ltd.
6 Habib Bank Ltd
7 Habib Metropolitan Bank 
8 National Bank of Pakistan 
9 Silk Bank Ltd
10 Sindh Bank Ltd
11 Soneri Bank Ltd
12 Standard Chartered Bank 
13 Summit Bank Ltd.
14 The Bank of Khyber
15 The Bank of Punjab
16 United Bank Ltd.
Grand Total 22 (6+16)
Source: SBP (2016) 
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Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Philips-Perron test
No trend Trend No trend Trend
Discount rate -1.669 -1.141 -1.918 -1.262
Conventional banks
    Lending rate -1.734 -1.629 -1.531 -0.647
    Deposit rate -2.108 -0.85 -1.764 -0.351
    Excess liquidity -1.027 -1.629 -1.14 -2.353
    Required reserves
Islamic banks
    Lending rate -1.681 -1.498 -1.972 -1.012
    Deposit rate -1.577 -0.899 -1.348 -0.557
    Excess liquidity -1.523 -1.725 -2.414 -3.155
    Required reserves
*5% Critical Value -2.887 -3.445 -2.886 -3.443
Notes: Augmented Dickey fuller test uses optimal lags to control the serial correlation, while Philips- Perron test applies non 
parametric Kernel to address the problem of the serial correlation.
Table A3.
Unit root test results
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Table A5.
Literature on interest rate pass through to retail rates in Pakistan
Study Period Instrument Method
Pass through estimates
Short run Long run 
Lending 
rate
Deposit 
Rate
Lending 
rate
Deposit 
Rate
Fazal and 
Salam (2013)
2005:06 - 2011:05 6-m TB rate VECM 0.3727* 0.3058* 0.887* 0.657*
Hanif and 
Khan (2012)
2001:07 - 2011:08 1-wk KIBOR ARDL 0.3 0.13 0.91 0.64
Mohsin (2011) 2001:11 - 2011:03 DR PC 0.1 0.16 0.2 Nil
Khawaja and 
Khan (2008)
1991:06 -2008:06 TB rate TFA Nil Nil 0.43³ 0.164
Qayyum et al. 
(2006)
1991:03 -2004:12 TB rate TFA Nil 0.18 0.41² 0.223¹
SBP (2005) 1999:07-2006:06 TB cut-off 
rate
ARDL 0.198 0.044 0.987 0.444
*significant at 5 percent. 
TB: Treasury Bill, DR: Discount Rate, KIBOR: Karachi Interbank Offered Rate, ARDL: Auto Regressive Distributed Lags, TFA: 
Transfer Function Approach, PC: Panel Cointegration. VAR: Vector Auto Regression, VECM: Vector Error Correction Mechanism, 
Nil indicates no pass through detected. 
¹ Pass through to the saving deposit rate (deposit with less than 6-month maturity), while long-run pass through takes around 3 
years to complete. ² No short-run pass through and long-run pass through requires one and half to two years to complete. ³ Long-
run pass through requires one to one and half years. 4 Long-run pass through requires one year.
